Introduction
And the test of all of us-for all of us had our origins on the other side of the sea-is whether we will assist in enabling America to live her separate and independent life, retaining our ancient affections, indeed, but determining everything we do by the interests that exist on this side of the sea.
-Woodrow Wilson
As the United States continues to struggle with charting a coherent foreign policy course in today's post-Cold War world, it finds itself confronted by an international landscape far less clearly defined than that of the past fifty years. The overwhelming clarity of purpose provided by the Soviet threat has been swept away. In its place we find the dynamics of an increasingly interdependent global economy being played out against the backdrop of emerging regional tensions precipitated by long-dormant causes and hatreds finding new voice after years of repression. At the same time, we find an increasing roster of domestic players in the foreign policy arena who, as Donald Snow and Eugene Brown point out, no longer subscribe to the theory that "politics ends at the water's edge." 1 In this turbulent arena where foreign policy and domestic political issues converge, we see the emergence of America's ethnic minorities as a potentially significant force in the equation. In examining exactly what role these oft-overlooked foreign policy players occupy, this paper focuses first on a discussion of the growing political clout ethnic groups wield in this country. From there it examines two post-World War II cases where ethnic groups within the United States have successfully influenced foreign policy: 1) Jewish-Americans and our policies toward Israel, and 2)
Irish-Americans and our policies toward Northern Ireland. To provide some contrast to these successful groups the paper then examines two groups who initially met with failure in their efforts to influence foreign policy: 1) Armenian-Americans and the Armenian Question, and 2) Arab-Americans and U.S. Middle East Policy. For both groups the paper also explores their efforts to learn from the experiences of others and some more recent limited successes based upon that experience. Finally, the paper discusses the impact these emerging political influences may have on foreign policy priorities and their implications for the future. 
The Growing Political Power of America's Ethnic Groups
The political influence of ethnic groups in the United States is not a recent phenomenon. In major cities such as New York, Boston, and Chicago the impact at the local level has been a prominent feature of the political landscape since the great influx of European immigrants in the late 1800's and early 1900's. The wise politician in those local arenas was quick to appeal to ethnic pride in his dealings with the locals:
Thus, New York's most celebrated mayor, Jimmy "the Hat" Walker, would often begin a speech with numerous "city comparisons." New York, he would tell his audience, had more Irish than Dublin, more Jews then Jerusalem, more Italians than Rome, and so on, his examples confined only by his geographical recollection on that day. 1 The ethnic vote has also played an increasingly important role in politics at the national level, due in large part to two critical factors. The first is simply a matter of numbers: the 1990 Census showed that foreign-born persons numbered 20 million and comprised eight percent of the total population. 2 The trends indicate Hispanics will replace blacks as the dominant minority by 2010. 3 In addition, projections are that the white majority, just over 75 percent in 1990, will continue to fall and approach a "majority minority" by 2050. 4 The second significant factor as it relates to ethnic political potential at the national level is the tendency for these groups to concentrate in the large cities of states with a significant number of electoral votes. 5 The six states of California (54 electoral votes in 1996), New York (33), Florida (25), Texas (32), New Jersey (15) , and Illinois (22) accounted for 73 percent of the 20 million foreign-born persons included in the 1990
Census. 6 While the electoral votes cited were based on estimated data from the 1990 Census 7 , the message is clear:
When victory margins in these states start shrinking below 4 percentage points (as they do in all but aberrant elections), it behooves the candidates to take a good long look at the votes of ethnics and the manner in which they can be influenced. This phenomenon is not surprising given that political parties within the U.S. consistently target ethnic groups for votes and contributions. In a July 1997 article discussing the impact of ethnic groups on foreign policy, U.S. News and World Report indicated that the Democratic National Committee had specifically targeted not only Asian-Americans during the last campaign, but also Poles, Greeks, Irish, Lithuanians, Hungarians, Croatians, and Albanians.
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The potential political power of ethnic groups does not in and of itself translate into an ability to influence foreign policy decisions. Sheer numbers do not necessarily generate political power unless the group can somehow be motivated to exert that power through the physical act of voting. What this discussion does suggest is that ethnic groups exist now with sufficient numbers to be a force on the political scene, and if sufficiently motivated, can exert an influence which representatives at all levels ignore at their political peril. The discussion in the following chapter centers on two cases where the requisite motivation existed and the Jewish-and Irish-American communities were successful at influencing foreign policy decisions.
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Breaking the Code: Successful Group Pressure
In searching for examples of the effective marshalling of ethnic group pressure with respect to foreign policy decisions, one is hard pressed to identify two more successful groups than Jewish-and Irish-Americans.
The Jewish-American Lobby and U.S. Policy toward Israel
The United States has played a significant role in the affairs of the State of Israel since its inception and throughout that time the Jewish-American community has played an important part in ensuring foreign policy decisions were on the whole supportive. It is not the intent of this paper to outline these interactions in detail, but simply to provide an overview of the process. Conference of Presidents serves as the conduit to the executive branch. 6 Implicit in any dealings with these groups by members of Congress and even the President, is the ability to support their friends by delivering political and financial rewards.
The Jewish-American community's efforts to influence American foreign policy towards Israel have for the most part been successful. While there have been partial defeats along the way, such as the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia during the Reagan Administration, there is no question that the group exerts significant influence over the process of developing foreign policy toward Israel. According to Mitchell Bard, the success stems from the advantages the group enjoys "in every area considered relevant to interest group influence. It has a) a large and vocal membership; b) members who enjoy high status and legitimacy; c) a high degree of electoral participation (voting and financing); d) effective leadership; e) a high degree of access to decisionmakers; and f) public support. More over, for reasons at least partly attributable to the lobby's efforts, the lobby's primary objective-a U.S. commitment to Israel-has been accepted as a national interest.
To much the same extent, the same analysis can be applied to our next ethnic group case-the Irish-Americans.
Irish-Americans and U.S. Policy toward Northern Ireland
Irish-Americans, perhaps due to the circumstances under which many of their ancestors departed Ireland, have always maintained a special affinity for the homeland they left behind. In the early days of Irish immigration, this manifested itself in 
Unsuccessful Group Influence and the Learning Curve
While Jewish and Irish-Americans have proven themselves relatively successful at securing support for their causes within the American political system, others have not fared as well. The experiences of Armenian-and Arab-Americans serve as a useful counterpoint to the previous discussion. While both groups have historically had to deal with failure in championing their respective causes with respect to U.S. foreign policy, the research shows a movement along the learning curve that has produced more recent successes or at least a more encouraging trend.
Armenian-Americans and U.S. Policy toward the Armenian Question
While the history of ethnic Armenians as a definable group within American society really began in the late nineteenth century, their arrival on these shores was simply the latest manifestation of a diaspora that had its roots nearly seven centuries earlier. To understand the motivations of Armenian-Americans with respect to their homeland, it is essential to have a basic knowledge of the events that shaped their collective history.
The Armenian people can trace their heritage in the region of present-day Armenia and Western Turkey back to at least 550 B.C. when they were first mentioned in Greek writings of the times. 1 The Armenian state was the first to adopt Christianity as its official religion in A.D. 301, an identification proudly proclaimed throughout its history and one at least partially to blame for the level of persecution suffered during later generations. 2 In addition to a religious affiliation which made them distinct from the majority of peoples in the region, the Armenians suffered from a geo-strategic location which placed them squarely in the path of every marauding conqueror to arrive on the scene from Asia, the Middle East, or Russia. Beginning in the eleventh century, the invasions of the Seljuq Turks, the Mongols, Tamerlane, and the Ottoman Turks scattered the Armenian population throughout the Middle East, Western Europe, and Russia.
For Armenians these centuries were truly a "dark age," one in which the settled agricultural population of Eastern Anatolia suffered from the inroads of the nomads and the destructive fighting between the Turks and the Persians. As a result, large numbers left their homeland for life in exile, and the Armenians, like the Jews, became a stateless people. At the same time, the struggle continued back in Transcaucasia with the Dashnak party "calling on all Armenians-including the young, the old, the rich, the women, the priests-to support the "people's war" and the "Sacred Task" against the Turkish government." 7 The Armenians remaining within the Ottoman Empire consequently bore the brunt of retaliations for the actions of the Nationalists. With the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Turks saw an opportunity to resolve the Armenian problem once and for all. While specifics are debated between the opposing sides, what seems clear is that through a combination of forced relocation, starvation, and outright massacre, the Ottoman Turks brutally disposed of nearly 1.5 million Armenians in 1915-1916. 8 Described by U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau as "the murder of a nation," the Armenian Genocide sparked outrage throughout the world. Relief efforts were generated within the U.S. by the Armenian Relief Committee, which raised $100,000 in the first month and $11,000,000 by the war's end. 9 The outbreak of revolution in Russia during October 1917 led to the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus and created a window of opportunity for Armenian nationalists to form an independent Armenian republic in May 1918. Armenian forces continued to fight for the Allied cause in the region until the surrender of the Ottomans in October. 10 In the Resolution of the Five Powers, signed in January of 1919 by the United States among others, the following pledge was made:
…because of the historic misgovernment of the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire.
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The United States, however, had never declared war on the Ottoman Empire and so was in no position to dictate the terms of a final settlement. The original agreement, approved by the Allies at the San Remo conference in 1920, provided for an Armenian republic whose disputed borders with Turkey would be determined by President Woodrow
Wilson. Known as the Treaty of Sèvres, the agreement was signed by representatives of the Ottoman Empire in August despite dictating a significant loss of territory and the internationalization of the Straits. aid to Azerbaijan until that country abandons its blockade of Armenia and the NagornoKarabakh region. 18 This past year Armenian-Americans raised $11 million through a telethon in Los Angeles to finance improvements to the road transportation infrastructure between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 19 Finally, Armenian groups in this country continue to press for official recognition of the Armenian Genocide to include a day to honor those who were killed. This is an extremely sensitive subject with the Turks, who have never formally recognized their role in the atrocity.
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The Armenian-Americans represent an ethnic group that showed little early success in forging foreign policy agendas. Their perseverance and willingness to apply the tactics employed successfully by other groups have paid dividends recently.
Arab-Americans and Middle East Policy
Another group which has had a marked lack of success in the foreign policy arena is the Arab-Americans. Perhaps the most compelling reason for this lack of success is that the group finds itself face-to-face with the powerful Jewish-American lobby on most to argue for. 21 A second reason for their lack of success is the fact that just as the various nations that make up the Arab world have a diverse range of opinions on issues, so too do the members of the Arab-American community. They are divided by these diverse origins and have traditionally not been politically motivated. While they do form organizations, these usually tend to be social, cultural, educational, or charitable. 22 There are some 400
local Arab-American groups spread throughout the country. These usually have limited memberships and are run on tight budgets by one-man deep administrative staffs.
Historically it has also not helped the cause to have many of these organizations, whether in their speeches or their publications, take a fairly radical tone which often alienates the American audience at-large from the start. 23 Another significant hindrance to the effectiveness of Arab-Americans in influencing foreign policy is that their approach has been reactive rather than proactive. In most cases the Arab lobby reacts to what Israel is doing or has done. The message, therefore, is anti-Israel rather than pro-Arab. This approach, necessitated to a certain extent by a lack of consensual policy positions amongst the community, sets an overall negative tone and does not allow for a well-orchestrated campaign. As mentioned earlier, the post-Cold War world is drastically changed from the paradigm we grew accustomed to during the past fifty years. Strong historical pressures for self-determination, often fueled by intense nationalism or ethnic hatred, have outlived the political system that kept them in check for so many years. We see these pressures reemerging at a time when the threat to our national existence posed by the Soviet Union has essentially disappeared and no legitimate threat of equal magnitude is on the horizon.
One aspect of the census data that was not discussed earlier was the diversity of Another implication to be gleaned from both cases is that an ethnic group has a better chance of effectively influencing foreign policy if their cause can be seen to be in keeping with the national interests of the United States. While some may argue as to whether the establishment of the State of Israel back in 1948 was truly in keeping with our national interests at the time, within ten years the fact that Israel was serving as a counter-balance for growing Soviet influence in the region was a significant factor in our Middle East strategy. The task of proving this connection may, in fact, be somewhat simplified today with the lack of a clear threat and clearly defined national interests.
James Schlesinger contends that U.S. foreign policy today is a result of "the stapling together of a series of goals put forth by domestic constituency groups." 3 One national interest that has remained reasonably well articulated in the National Security Strategy is the fostering of democratic forms of government throughout the
world. An ethnic group with the ability to energize its members for the cause at least has an opportunity to influence American policymakers, even though outright military aid is not likely. The Jewish community is a perfect example, albeit one endowed with far more advantages than the majority of ethnic groups will be able to muster.
While we have focused primarily on efforts by ethnic groups to influence foreign policy toward a positive outcome for their own agenda, the same issues relate to exerting influence to deny an adversary a positive outcome. The trick is in packaging the proposals and again the key is couching the debate in terms of U.S. national interests. If your group's position is perceived to be more closely aligned with these interests, you win. If not, you lose. It is also important to recognize that your audience in this debate is not the entire American population. The focus of an interest group's efforts is the decision-maker possessing the power to influence events. Jürgen Habermas described the differences in public and quasi-public opinion in the following manner:
These formal opinions [quasi-public opinion] can be traced back to specific institutions: they are officially or semi-officially authorized as announcements, proclamations, declarations, and speeches. Here we are dealing with opinions that circulate in a relatively narrow circle-skipping the mass of the population-between the large political press and, generally, those publicist organs that cultivate rational debate and the advising, influencing, and deciding bodies with political or politically relevant jurisdictions (cabinet, government commissions, administrative bodies, parliamentary committees, corporate bureaucracies, and union secretariats).
Conclusion
Will a group's views of America's national interest be neglected because of the group's size, skin color, religion, or country of origin? Can anyone be excluded from the formation of a true national interest? It is the ethnic interest groups, because of their ties, passions, and preoccupations that sensitize the relevant parts of government. It is the ethnic interest groups that remind U.S. officials of the moral considerations in our foreign policy. In the current global environment, the opportunity exists for further ethnic group influence, provided these groups can successfully convince policymakers their goals are in keeping with today's broadly defined national interests. An appreciation of this dynamic in the foreign policy formulation process is essential for those involved in both the diplomatic and military professions. As the U.S. continues to espouse a policy of engagement for virtually every corner of the earth, the picture of where national interests are clearly involved becomes increasingly blurred. Barring the reemergence of a peer competitor to focus our policy considerations or a demonstrated willingness on the part of our political leadership to apply a far more narrow interpretation of national interests, the current environment seems likely to continue.
Contrary to protestations from various circles that the often narrow, single-issue focus of these ethnic interest groups is somehow "un-American," as Mitchell Bard points out in this chapter's opening quotation, group concerns often serve as our moral compass in policy considerations. Far from being "un-American," taking advantage of the political process as it now exists is arguably the most American of activities.
As a consequence, the number of effective lobby groups will undoubtedly grow along with a corresponding increase in the number of voices seeking recognition within policy circles. At the same time the potential for a lack of coherency in U.S. foreign policy also increases, leaving allies and adversaries alike to guess at our intentions in a given situation. Given this increased potential for misunderstanding, the prudent military leader would be wise to recognize that literally any point on the globe could rapidly become a theater of operations. While the road from ethnic group interest to military involvement is long and winding, the record would seem to indicate that in our political system, where those who can deliver the votes hold enormous power, the decision to take the first steps down that path may be easier than anticipated.
Notes
